Open AccessThe Phenomenon of Conscience in Social WorkProf. Dr. theol. Jindřich ŠrajerProf. Dr. theol. Jindřich ŠrajerAuthors email:[email protected] Department of Social and Charity Work Faculty of Theology University of South Bohemia České Budějovice Czech Republic Search for more papers by this authorPublished Online:Aug 2021https://doi.org/10.13109/diac.2020.11.2.173SectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail AboutAbstractThis study offers theoretical explanations and distinctions associated with the phenomenon of conscience in social work. It uses the perspective of Roman-Catholic theology, or more precisely of the Roman-Catholic Church. It briefly reflects on an anthropology of conscience and then contemplates the essence of conscience and its relationship to the truth. In the reflection on the contradiction between Christian and secularized morality (given by the renowned Swiss Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar 1905-1988), it shows the importance of conscience in the value inconsistencies of the attitudes of today’s world. Finally, based on the impulses of the apostolic exhortation of Pope Francis Amoris laetitia (2016), it reflects on practical impulses concerning the place and importance of conscience in social work.1. IntroductionSocial work practice, or social work as an academic discipline, indeed any field of study preparing for the profession, cannot exclude ethics from its point of view. Social work, in its various forms,1 focuses on working with people. It must therefore consider fundamental human values such as human dignity, human rights, and social justice. The international and Czech codes of ethics of social workers make the respective recommendations in this regard.2 They see ethical awareness as a necessary part of the professional practice of social workers and also point out the ability and commitment to ethical behavior as a fundamental aspect of the quality of the social services provided. This includes, in particular, the demand for the support and protection of the physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual integrity as well as well-being of each person. The essential idea of the codes mentioned above is that, to maintain a set level of professional work and the ability to deal with ethical problems linked to social work practice, the social worker must accept responsibility for continuous lifelong education and training. They must take care of themselves, which includes, among other things, having the willingness to engage in ethical discussions with colleagues and employers. Thus, the responsibility of social workers should be strengthened. They should ensure themselves that their decisions are ethically based, or that they will „be prepared to give reasons for their decisions based on ethical deliberation and that they are responsible for their choices and actions.”3This implies a clear emphasis on the social worker’s personality, personal commitment, ethical erudition, and competence, things that demand continued care and growth. This is quite different from the content of many publications on ethics in social work or from social work study propositions. In these publications, the emphasis lies mainly on the knowledge of ethical theories, ethical dilemmas, case reports, or the ability of a social worker to apply proven behavioral and decision-making patterns into practice. There is also an effort to protect the social worker from unpleasant stressful situations and dilemmas or – at the very least – to reduce them.4 The more the approach is justified and understandable, the more it can also lead to the undesirable „depersonalization” of the social worker. It forms them more into the role of mere experts of ethical theories and their applicator rather than into the role of someone who acts out of conviction. Social workers should be constantly willing to expose themselves to the healthy tension of confrontation with the imperfect and often complicated life reality of the client (and therefore the clients) and, at the same time, to look for an ethically justifiable and defensible action or attitude (in a given situation), i.e., to look for the ethically best action.If the essence of ethics in social work is the latter, then the conscience of a social worker remains fundamentally unmissable in the field of social work. The latter attitude is also emphasized by ethical codes of the profession of social worker (as shown briefly above). Here, it is necessary to see the inevitable source of social worker’s personal commitment, their constant willingness to „take the risk,” to act confidently and prudently from the depths of their own convictions. From this perspective, the phenomenon of conscience becomes a decisive factor in the above-mentioned quality of social work. However, this fact requires the necessary clarification and distinction to avoid possible misunderstandings. This article offers, on a theoretical basis, crucial clarifications and distinctions associated with the phenomenon of conscience in social work. It uses the perspective of Roman-Catholic theology, or more precisely that of the Roman-Catholic Church5. First, we introduce a brief theological anthropology of conscience, a reflection on the essence of conscience and its relationship to the truth, which excludes arbitrariness. We will also think about the unfounded attitudes requesting a waiver of conscience. Subsequently, we capture the meaning of the phenomenon of conscience presented by the important Swiss Roman-Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905−1988), using his reflection on the contradiction between Christian and secularized morality. Finally, based on the suggestions of the apostolic exhortation of Pope Francis Amoris laetitia (2016, hereinafter AL), we reflect on practical suggestions concerning the place and importance of conscience in social work.2. Humans as Moral Beings – A Theological Anthropology of ConscienceHumans as moral beings, in their dignity, are inherently confronted with responsibility. They cannot give it up or delegate it to someone else. That would deny them the value of their humanity; they would cease to be a human.6 Life is unique and unrepeatable, and as such, it should be shaped on the basis of one’s own conscience where good or evil can be distinguished. Conscience is an internal quantity, and as such, it is shrouded in mystery.7 Not only from the outside, but also from the position of a person concerned, it is not possible to completely penetrate it. Empirical science document possible internal or external influences (e.g., mental dispositions, external authorities, environment) that shape its form. Given the subjectivity of conscience (which makes it more susceptible to error and self-overestimation), a locked perception of the individual conscience, i.e. an understanding of the conscience as rejecting impulses from the outside, and not being open to further knowledge, education, formation, and growth appear to be the most problematic and dangerous tendencies.8Conscience as a reflection of humanity, the dignity of human beings, is necessarily tied to values and to the content that expresses and protects these values. It is tied to the community. In the absence of this link, invoking freedom of conscience would only mean admitting a lack of understanding in the area of the true value of oneself or others. There would be no guarantee of human rights without the connection to community, indeed they would even become dangerous. They would be threatened by empty freedoms that would prioritize only one’s personal interests. One would feel bound to neither community nor the universal good nor law. They would respect them as long as there would be a guarantee of their own rights.9 It would be freedom without understanding, without the awareness of the fact that „freedom includes the ability of the conscience to perceive the fundamental values of humanity that apply to every human being” (Ratzinger 1996, 12.)10The above-mentioned incident sufficiently reveals the permanently existing tension between the conscience as the highest standard of action and the requirement of the norm (authority), the law in practice. The practice of social work (increasingly) shows that this tension has no solution that favors one at the expense of the other. Rather, social work practice is about understanding their necessary complementarity. Conscience evaluates above all the specific situations and the associated requirements. The norm, the law (even if strictly formulated, e.g., do not steal), represent, quite the contrary, a certain degree of generalization given by its nature. It requires or generally prohibits certain actions. In the above sense, that’s where the possible risks are hidden: On the one hand, there is the possibility of prioritizing subjective truth or rather a personal view of the matter at the expense of general truth, the good of the whole, i.e., the perspective of others11; on the other hand, there is a risk of excessive adherence to the strict formulation of a particular norm or law, or even invoking the validity of a bad law or regulation (from a moral point of view). All these possible approaches can be considered superficial, narrow-minded, formal, or rigid. As a result, they mean nothing more than the unwanted „objectification” of human beings. They are an expression of loss, the refusal or underestimation of one’s required liability.12 These possible risks necessarily direct our attention again to the very basis of our being, our existence. At the same time, among other things, we can remind ourselves of a useful medieval division of conscience.The medieval (scholastic) tradition considers the concept of conscience as a two-level concept based on the concept of humans as beings created by God. As such, they carry within them God’s image, the good that is God themself. This tradition, inspired by the Stoic teaching of the microcosm,13 speaks of the ontological level of conscience synderesis. At this level, conscience represents the natural ability to „memorize what is good and true.”14 This basic disposition is followed by the ability of the conscience (constientia) to apply the known good to a specific situation.15 Thomas Aquinas, in the process of updating conscience, of making specific decisions, emphasizes (among other things) the importance of the virtue of wisdom.16 According to the above-mentioned tradition, conscience cannot be understood only as an observer and subsequently as an executor of things and actions known in advance. Rather, there is also a dynamic and creative component of conscience in the game. This fact was emphasized in the debate on conscience especially during the Second Vatican Council (1962−1965). The metaphor of conscience presented in the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes (1965) seeks to capture the depths and perspectives of conscience. It deserves to be quoted at this point:In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience when necessary speaks to his heart: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged. Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his depths. In a wonderful manner conscience reveals that law which is fulfilled by love of God and neighbor. In fidelity to conscience, Christians are joined with the rest of men in the search for truth, and for the genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of individuals from social relationships. Hence the more right conscience holds sway, the more persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and strive to be guided by the objective norms of morality (Gaudium et Spes: 1965, § 16).The above text accurately captures the issues previously reflected upon. However, it develops our understanding further. To emphasize this, the text regards revealing or discovery, which means „something completely different from just passive observation. Discovery is a creative process in which one works receptively and creatively.”17 At the same time, the text regards a law that must be obeyed. Conscience „appears here as something predetermined, as a normative truth in which God himself speaks to man and by which the human person (as a moral subject) is bound” (Rhonheimer: 1994, 34f.; quoted according to Štica: 2019, 90). From our point of view, it is significant that conscience is presented here „as the ‘constitutive plane of human existence’ which unites all people regardless of their religious and worldviews.”18 However, in connection with this view of conscience, the consideration of the well-known English author C. S. Lewis (1902−1963) becomes interesting.In Mere Christianity, Lewis talks about the three parts of morality. The first is acceptable and understandable more or less for everyone: It concerns interpersonal relationships. Specifically, one should not hurt or endanger other people through own actions. At this level, general coherence and cooperation are evident. According to Lewis, though, staying only at this level would be self-deception. He thought the second part of morality is also important: the moral quality of one’s heart, which requires care and cultivation. According to Lewis, no system can work well if people in it are greedy, cowardly, grumpy, or conceited. Even the best system cannot prevent thieves and tyrants from playing their game in it. As Lewis points out, differences already appear in this part, and agreement is unclear here. But according to Lewis, the third part of morality is in the end the decisive part; it is very difficult to find agreement here: the relationship between humans and the power that created them. Here is where the challenge of different worldviews becomes apparent. As Lewis reminds us, anyone who sees life as something that lasts only a few decades and then definitely ends does not address some issues of life. However, if someone perceives life from the perspective of eternity, these questions become vital to them (cf. Lewis: 1996, 72−75).Lewis’s reasoning is interesting mainly because it offers a more differentiated approach to the reality of life, by offering the stratification of morality. Social work copies and reflects this reality. Undoubtedly in this area of human practice, there is a general consensus about good actions, i.e., one should not endanger or harm others. The need to care for the moral quality of one’s inner self, albeit supported by ethical codes of social work, may not always be obvious in social work practice. In the end, however, the main challenge may lie in the discrepancy of worldviews and what they mean for morality (as mentioned by Lewis). These are not just real differences in the worldview among social workers and between social workers and their clients. In the end, the most fundamental difference may lie in the discrepancy between the worldview of the social worker and their superior(s) or the social facility where they work. These differences raise ethical issues that affect the conscience of everyone involved19 and brings us back to the question of the tension between the subjectivity of conscience and the general demand for truth. Here, we adhere (with respect to our cultural environment) to Lewis’s contradiction between Christian morality and non-Christian (secular) morality.20 Against the background of this contradiction, we deal with the question of the significance of the conscience and its phenomenon in light of the contradictory attitudes present in the modern world in the next section. This part of the article is inspired by the reasoning of the Swiss Roman-Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. Given the reflected areas of social work practice, we should briefly recall that the freedom of conscience presented here has and must have its obvious moral and legal contours. The Second Vatican Council points to two important moments, following the demand for freedom of conscience guaranteed in democratic societies: (1) No one must be forced to act against their conscience. (2) An individual is entitled to this freedom within reasonable limits. In other words, the freedom of such individual and their conscience cannot be understood individually. Freedom is not the personal freedom of an individual only, as it is always the freedom of others. The individual decision of an individual always has a social context. Within the moral and legal order, an individual has not only rights but also obligations. Appealing to freedom of conscience, therefore, can never restrict or harm the rights of others. Acts that threaten society or another person are detached from the right to freedom of conscience (cf. Dignitatis humanae: 1965, §1 and 2. Cf. also Život z víry: 2005, 101-104).3. The Importance of Conscience in Light of the Contradictory Attitudes in the Modern WorldChristianity is one of the basic pillars of our culture. It is still present in our culture, in how we think and see things, including the emphasis on traditional values. However, for the majority of society, it is no longer a personally shared life experience or a path. And it no longer guarantees the previous homogeneity of opinion and value in society. On the contrary, as a „small flock” (together with the others), it is confronted with a diversity of ideas, new information, and opinions, which, in their consequences, often make a person’s life confusing and superficial. In such a situation, it is not always easy to discover, define, and accept personal or social responsibility. Christian theology and ethics, in light of the value diversities of today’s world, urgently ask for clues and guidelines in human life.21The reasoning of the Swiss Roman-Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar addresses the question of a possible danger of unstoppable or forced ethical pluralism in the above sense. It may represent a fundamental departure from the ethical essentials.22 In terms of Lewis’ stratification of morality, Balthasar basically reflects the second and third parts of it. He points out the many attitudes of Jesus connected with different demands. They depended on the degree of people’s identification with him, respectively with the community of the church that represents him.23Balthasar believes that Jesus „apparently tolerated and even defended a number of ethical attitudes.” (Balthasar:1998, 73). He thinks this because Jesus rigorously demanded much of his disciples (close collaborators). On the other hand, he showed generous benevolence toward others (people, sinners). However, according to Balthasar, the contradiction of these attitudes is only seeming. Regarding the unified source, the new commandment of love (the base), Jesus’ „requirements (…) are unified in their rigor and benevolence.” (Balthasar: 1998, 73). On the one hand, they require greater sensitivity and a radicalization of the old ethics of the law (cf. Matt 5:17−6:4); on the other hand, they reject any ethical Pharisaism (Luke 18:9ff) and show solidarity with the spiritual poverty of „customs officers and sinners.” (Balthasar: 1998, 73).According to Balthasar, Jesus’ ethics is ultimately a „dynamic unity.” (Balthasar: 1998, 73). It is provided by the affection for sinners who are not far from love and who are healed by him, and by the request addressed to a converted sinner – „Go and sin no more!” (Balthasar: 1998, 73). The converted „not only accepts the goodness of love but must embrace it and thus submit to the demands of selfless love. Such love must be strict to itself in order to be generous to others” (Balthasar: 1998, 74).Balthasar notices a fundamental practical problem concerning the dynamic unity of Jesus’ ethics. He formulates it by asking whether, given the diversity of the moral standard of individual members of the church, in this case, sinners and those on the moral edge, it is possible to present and impose the perfection of Christian love as a norm (cf. Balthasar: 1998, 74). According to Balthasar, the church can approach this difficult situation in two ways.In the first case, the church can set for all, regardless of their dispositions to love, an ethics system that is focused on the aimed ideal. However, regarding historical experience, according to Balthasar, this eventually leads to a „double morality” in the church (morals for ordinary Christians and for those who consider themselves the „better ones”). Indeed, throughout history, certain demands made by Jesus on his disciples (such as total surrender to God) „will be understood as a practical concretization of this aimed norm, and, according to this concretization, the existence of other Christians will be measured.”24The second solution, according to Balthasar, is that „a multitude of forms of realization in the name of the one and only commandment of love will be accepted” (Balthasar: 1998, 75). However, according to Balthasar, this solution is associated with the danger of problematic ethical pluralism, which can cause a retreat from the commandment of love to a mere loving tolerance for various human weaknesses. He thus concludes that the position of a Christian in the world is practically close to that of a settler on the edge of the church. In other words, Christianity (or individual Christians) live in a pluralistic world, a world with differing views on what is good and evil, on what is allowed or not. Also, there are many Christians who only partly identify with the church, live in „secular” surroundings that often think and act contrary to Christian ethics. According to Balthasar, the church will not „be able to simply present the aimed norm to such Christians as this norm was intended for the ‘totally identified’ who can strive to fulfil it only in living faith” (Balthasar: 1998, 75). He then follows up with a fundamental question: „So should they be left to their own conscience, the last norm? Should they be given a generally humanly understood idea of love or humanity and stay without the specifically Christian norms and commandments? Where will the boundaries be between these labels for ‘fully’ and ‘partially engaged’ then?“ (Balthasar: 1998, 75f.).In response to the above, Balthasar turns his view to the early and Middle Ages of the church, where the Christian perfection of love applied to all Christians. This love was the aimed at norm. According to Balthasar, it was not a vague kind of humanity but was set by the precise and harsh demands of the Sermon on the Mount. According to him, this norm can be „integrally lived in various forms of the Christian life ..., although, as he points out, a stronger involvement in the laws of the ‘world’ could make the pure realization of Christian love more difficult” (Balthasar: 1998, 76f.).It is this complexity, caused by „the personal and social connection of Christians with the world in general and with the world of their time in particular,” (Balthasar: 1998, 77) that, according to Balthasar, requires directives from the church. „The more directly they reflect the love of Christ, the more obvious and more accepted they are” (Balthasar: 1998, 77). If this love is indivisible, this indivisibility or unity must appear in the ethical guidelines of the church to prevent ethical pluralism. „It is done precisely by Jesus’ words: ‘follow me’ (Matt 9:13). At the same time, Christ’s followers are asked for much greater justice than the one shown by the scribes and Pharisees: ‘For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven’ (Matt 5:20). The same ethic brings people out of their various situations in order to lead them to Christ. It also leads them into various situations so that they can fulfil a single Christian existence there in the most conflicting living conditions” (Balthasar: 1998, 77).If we try to transfer the above-mentioned reflections to the field of social work, we can find at least two contact points, though these are quite differentiated. First of all, social work practiced in a pluralistic society must clarify its motivations (concerning values and opinions) and its target perspectives. These cannot be just the proclamatory references to human dignity or human rights given without their further detailed definition and without the clarification of the good life ideal which social work wants to help fulfill. In other words, social work must clarify which of the clients’ expectations should be met or not (cf. Šrajer: 2019a, 182−186 ). Expressed in the words of the theologian Balthasar, social work should protect itself from the „threatening pluralism” that diverts from the ethically and thus humanly essential and tends toward the mere benevolence to various human weaknesses.Defining the good life ideal, however, cannot mean denying or ignoring the true plurality of attitudes and the degree of internal identification of the social worker – and therefore the client – with the values that embody the ideal. Rather, it is a matter of seeking support for their personal growth, uncovering viable paths leading to the set ideal, and helping them to remain the protagonists of the set ideal even under the most conflicting living conditions. They should fulfill the moral identity of their own existence in the above sense. In other words, it is a search for ways to stimulate the social worker’s and also the client’s (or clients’) moral responsibility, creativity, and personal growth, while also about being aware of the ideal that inspires as well as binds.4. The Impetus of the Apostolic Exhortation of Pope Francis Amoris Laetitia (AL) to the Place and Importance of Conscience in Social WorkThe Aposotlic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia (AL) of Pope Francis deals with issues of Christian marriage and family and is not directly related to social work, can, in the sense of the above, be intellectually inspiring and clarifying within this area of human practice at the level of principles and methodical stimuli. Its suggestions specify the place and importance of conscience in social work. On the one hand, the document points out the problematic ethical pluralism reflected by Hans Urs von Balthasar, which consists of providing space for human weakness and the selfish and violence-oriented side of humans.(cf. AL: 2016, § 33f., §39) On the other hand, it shows sometimes overly idealistic, rigorist, even fundamentalist tendencies of the church and the attitudes of individual Christians, which do not sufficiently take into account the human mystery and their conscience (cf. AL: 2016, § 35-39). In other words, the Pope’s document depicts the Christological character of Christian ethics, which includes both reason and love in their complementarity and tension.25 In this way, the document gets closer to reality and offers numerous stimuli that can further specify the answer to the question of the place and importance of conscience in social work.In this document, the Pope ponders not only the essence of conscience but mainly its practical role. At the same time, he enters the „tension” field and – in some cases with a certain exaggeration – the „battle” field of everyday life. He touches on life issues, decisions, fights, victories, and losses. Central to this debate is the question of the role of conscience when confronting the requirements of norms and law. Similarly, this question is significant in the field of social work in the form of ethical problems and dilemmas. In the first case, considering the work of social workers, these are situations where the required decision is obvious, even though it runs against the social worker’s personal conscience. In the second case, it is a situation where the social worker faces two or more equally inappropriate possibilities: a conflict of moral principles, where it is not entirely clear which of them is more acceptable.26 What is decisive in this respect in AL is the emphasis on the ability of human moral judgment, which develops in the horizon of experience and personal life history. Such an ability is an expression of human dignity and needs to be protected (Cf. Štica: 2019, 87f.). On this basis, the Pope emphasizes the necessity to reject those forms of coercion by the state (or anyone else, for that matter), which force one to act contrary to one’s own dignity. In such a case, according to the Pope, the persons concerned have a moral obligation to invoke conscientious objection. This may include a medical institution if people there are forced to act contrary to the dignity of the conscience and therefore the dignity of the human being.27 Conscience, as the Pope claims, should not be replaced but cultivated.28 A person’s decision-making should be „profoundly free of subjective caprice and accommodation to prevailing social mores.”29The Pope’s conception of conscience can be characterized as „an existential-ethical conception.” (Faber/Lintner: 2016, 306). For the Pope, the conscience is a place of discernment in the search for the morally right. He attributes a hermeneutic role to it. On the one hand, one is aware of one’s life situation with its own vulnerabilities and limitations; on the other hand, one is confronted with certain ideals and demands. From this point of view, the Pope wants those who intend to help others to be able to perceive this fact sensitively. They should put themselves in the role of accompanying persons who help in the process of necessary differentiation regarding specific challenges, questions, and decisions of clients (cf. AL: 2016, chapter 8). Looking at the practice of social work in the Czech Republic,